Promotion Tournaments and Capital Rationing by Han, Bing et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Promotion Tournaments and Capital
Rationing
Bing Han and David Hirshleifer and John Persons
October 2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6496/
MPRA Paper No. 6496, posted 31. December 2007 06:43 UTC
Promotion Tournaments and Capital Rationing∗
Bing Han
David Hirshleifer
John C. Persons
October 21, 2007
∗Han is at the McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin; Hirshleifer is at the Merage
School of Business, University of California, Irvine; Persons is at the Fisher College of Business, Ohio State
University. We are grateful for helpful comments and suggestions from an anonymous referee, Adolfo de
Motta (WFA discussant), Denis Gromb, Rose Liao, Sonya Seongyeon Lim, Terrance Odean, Christof Stahel,
Karen Wruck and seminar participants Ohio State University and Hope College, and at the 2006 Western
Finance Association meetings.
Abstract
We analyze capital allocation in a conglomerate where divisional managers with
uncertain abilities compete for promotion to CEO. A manager can sometimes
gain by unobservably adding variance to divisional performance. Capital ra-
tioning can limit this distortion, increase productive efficiency, and allow the
owner to make more accurate promotion decisions. Firms for which CEO tal-
ent is more important for firm performance are more likely to ration capital.
A rationed manager is more likely to be promoted even though all managers
are identical ex ante. When the tournament payoff is relatively small, offering
an incentive wage can be more efficient than rationing capital; however, when
tournament incentives are paramount, rationing is more efficient.
(JEL G30, G31, G39)
Firms often seem to provide their divisions with less capital than would be needed to fund
all positive-NPV projects, even though the corporation is free to raise additional capital
at low transaction costs. This phenomenon, capital rationing, is a continuing puzzle.1
Some explanations have involved reputation effects, asymmetric information, empire build-
ing propensities, and intra-firm bargaining.2 In this paper we offer a new explanation for
this behavior that does not rely on private information or on managers’ inherent desire for
large amounts of capital. Our explanation is based upon the observation that the structure
of internal labor markets resembles a tournament.3
Owing to uncertainty about managerial talent, the owner learns about managerial ability
by observing performance (as do the managers themselves). When divisional managers are
competing to be promoted to the position of CEO, they consider how their actions affect
the inferences made by the owner. Each manager seeks to increase the probability that he
will be evaluated as the very best of the cohort, thus earning promotion. Because of the
incentive to be in the upper tail of the talent distribution, managers add variance to the
divisional outcomes if they can do so unobservably and without destroying too much value.
Because the owner knows the manager’s objective and understands the opportunities to
surreptitiously increase risk, the owner forms assessments accurately — the manager gains
no advantage in equilibrium relative to a setting in which the manager has no discretion
over project risk. When making inferences about managerial talent, the owner adjusts the
outcomes to take account of his conjecture about the division’s additional risk. Even so, it
remains in the manager’s private interest to play the game by adding excess variance. If he
were to deviate from equilibrium by failing to do so, the owner would still assume he was
increasing risk. The failure to increase risk would reduce the probability that the manager
ends up with the highest inferred ability, thereby reducing his probability of promotion.
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We assume that a manager increases variance by diverting some of the division’s re-
sources from their most efficient use to another, risk-increasing use. Such activity destroys
part of the value of the division’s projects. For a given amount of distortion, we assume
that the value lost is greater for more profitable projects. We find that capital rationing,
which limits managers to superior projects for which risk-distortion is less attractive, can
be beneficial.
We consider a model in which each of three divisions has two independent investment
opportunities.4 Both projects have positive net present value. The more valuable project
is labeled project a and the less valuable one is project b. If each division is fully funded,
then for some parameter values, the managers will engage in the variance distortion scheme
described above. This impairs divisional performance, reducing the owner’s wealth, because
some of the resources of project b are diverted from their best use to variance-increasing
activities.5 In addition, variance distortion makes the owner’s inference problem more
difficult because the additional noise makes signals of manager talent less informative. This
results in poorer decisions about which of the three managers to promote to CEO, which
also reduces the owner’s wealth.
One method of mitigating these problems is to provide one or more of the divisions with
only enough capital to invest in one project. If distorting variance wastes more value when
the project is more profitable, then it is more costly for the manager to divert resources
from a superior project. When given only enough capital for the better project, the man-
ager optimally distorts less. This provides the owner with two benefits — higher profits
due to more efficient production, and fewer promotion mistakes (owing to better inferences
about manager talent). The cost is that a positive-NPV investment opportunity, project
b, is foregone. When the value of accurately assessing the talent of divisional managers is
2
sufficiently large relative to the value of project b, rationing capital to at least one division is
optimal. Furthermore, the owner understands that a rationed manager will add less risk, so
the owner observes a more precise signal of that manager’s ability. This makes the owner’s
posterior assessment of the manager’s ability more sensitive to observed performance, in-
creasing the chance that he wins top ranking. In consequence, the manager of a rationed
division is more likely to win promotion, even though the managers are ex ante identical.
For most of the analysis, we follow the incomplete contracts approach of Grossman and
Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) by assuming that the value created by the divisional
manager is not contractible, e.g., because it cannot be verified by a court. However, to
explore wages as an alternative avenue for influencing behavior, we also consider a setting
where there is a binary variable correlated with divisional performance that can be used
for contracting. If the correlation is sufficiently high and the CEO ‘prize’ is small enough,
the owner may choose to offer an incentive wage. But when the tournament prize is large,
capital rationing is more effective. Since we are interested in situations where tournament
incentives are paramount, we focus most of our attention on rationing rather than incentive
wages.
Our basic model takes the structure of the firm (three divisions) as given; we then explore
the implications of our approach for the optimal scope of the organization. An interesting
trade-off arises from learning about the talent of the divisional managers. The advantage
of a conglomerate is that an exceptionally talented CEO can create value in a broader
domain. However, a conglomerate with many divisions induces very large distortions by
managers, since a manager is much less likely to be rated best of ten candidates than best
of three candidates. The advantage of stand-alone divisions is that they avoid the variance
distortion resulting from the CEO tournament.
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The model focuses on the internal labor market, but we discuss possible extensions
to include an external market for CEOs. Although distortions are absent from stand-
alone divisions in our basic setting, when there are potential external candidates for CEO,
a de facto tournament is in process. Therefore, excessive risk taking can occur even in
focused firms, though presumably to a lesser extent, as promotion may occur through
non-tournament means. It also seems reasonable that better information about manager
talent can be obtained inside the firm than externally. Both these factors illustrate potential
efficiencies of conglomerates, since the conglomerate form admits the use of capital rationing
to control risk taking. Whether a conglomerate or a focused structure is better depends
on the importance of learning about managerial ability and the costs of rationing capital.
Changes in these fundamental factors may lead to mergers, divestitures, spin-offs, and so
on.
We also explain why it can be value-maximizing for the owner to announce that a subset
of the contenders have the “inside track” for the CEO position. This is a common practice;
a recent example is provided by the promotions of Stephen Crawford and Zoe Cruz to be
co-presidents of Morgan Stanley, an event that precipitated the battle between dissidents
and incumbent CEO Phillip Purcell (Craig and Smith 2004). In our model, narrowing the
set of contenders can eliminate the incentives of both the managers who are left out of
the running and the remaining contenders to add variance, thereby improving production
efficiency and providing better information about their true talent.6
Several previous papers examine capital allocation within the firm, and capital rationing
in particular. Several such models rely on asymmetric information, empire-building prefer-
ences or on bargaining among divisions.7 Our paper does not rely on these features and, in
contrast to Stein (1997, 2002) and Scharfstein and Stein (2000), rationing is efficient in our
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model even when there are no impediments to raising external capital.
Much closer to our approach is the model of Holmstro¨m and Ricart i Costa (1986). They
develop a model of capital allocation that is also based on career concerns and, as in our
model, risk-taking behavior plays an important role. The optimal contract in their model
provides downside protection to a risk averse manager. This protection can in equilibrium
make the managers too eager to adopt projects. The owner therefore commits to a capital
allocation rule that determines whether the managers’ projects are funded. Capital is
rationed in the sense that the optimal contract leaves some positive-NPV projects unfunded.
Our approach differs from that of Holmstro¨m and Ricart i Costa (1986) in several ways.
Their managers have private information about the investment projects, and the managerial
contract is designed to elicit this information. The managers in our model have no such
private information. Risk aversion is crucial to their results; if the manager were risk neutral,
first best would be achieved and there would be no rationing of capital. Risk aversion plays
no role in our results, as managers in our model are risk neutral. Another fundamental
difference is that managers in our model can alter the riskiness of the projects. Managers
in their model do not affect the risk of available projects; rather they decide whether to
invest. Of course, all of our results depend on the tournament structure of the internal
labor market, which is absent from their model.
Milbourn, Shockley, and Thakor (1999) provide a model in which managers in a mul-
tistage promotion tournament become excessively averse to failure in their assigned tasks.
Their paper does not examine the issue of capital rationing. A key difference between their
setting and ours is that their model has multiple positions into which the group of managers
can be promoted, so that a manager can attain promotion simply by avoiding a failure that
would distinguish him or her from other managers. Our focus is on the final promotion
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stage of high-level managers to a single CEO position, so that a manager needs to stand
out as superior in order to obtain the promotion.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents the model. Section 2 examines how the
existence of the promotion tournament affects risk-taking behavior by the division managers.
Section 3 considers the use of incentive wages to influence managerial behavior, and Section
4 examines the optimal allocation of capital. Section 5 discusses possible extensions. Section
6 concludes.
1. The Model
1.1 Structure
There are n = 3 divisional managers who are risk neutral and have uncertain talent θi. The
θi are independent and normal with mean zero and variance σ2θ . This prior distribution
is common to the owner and all the managers — managers have no private information
about their talent. At date 0, the owner allocates capital I to a manager, and the manager
invests in his division’s operations. There are two investment projects available, a and b.
Each project requires an investment of 1 unit of capital. The use of the physical capital is
contractible, so the owner can direct the managers to invest in project a, project b, or both.8
Project a generates a higher expected payoff than project b, va > vb > 1. For the time being,
we assume that the owner allocates I = 2 to each manager, so the manager invests in both
projects. We later consider the optimality of rationing capital. The manager also chooses
whether to add some excess variance to the project outcome; this will be explained shortly.
After the outcomes are observed for all the managers, the owner, who is also risk neutral,
promotes one manager to be the new CEO. The manager’s payoff for being promoted is
a monetary “prize” Z > 0, received from the firm.9 Z is not chosen by the owner, but is
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taken to be exogenous (e.g., determined by competition in the managerial labor market).
For simplicity, the discount rate is taken to be zero.
The outcome of division i’s operations is denoted xi; xi is observable but not con-
tractible. Our motivation for assuming that xi is not contractible is the standard notion in
the incomplete contracts literature that any measure used in a contract must be verifiable
by the court. Given the nature of xi, it would be impossible (or at least prohibitively costly)
to verify. This is so because the outcome xi represents the value effect of all the actions
taken by the manager while running the division. In addition to the current profitability
of projects a and b, this includes the anticipated cash flows from these projects that have
yet to be realized. Beyond this, xi represents the effectiveness of the manager’s strategic
initiatives; the plans put into motion for future investment projects; his ability to recruit,
motivate, and develop talented employees; his aptitude at managing important customer
and supplier relationships; and the myriad other qualities that will determine future prof-
itability. Taking xi to be noncontractible is reasonable because value creation involves not
just the current period’s cash flow, but also the change in the present value of future cash
flows.
If the manager utilizes corporate resources efficiently, with no risk-altering distortions,
the outcome is
xi = θi + va + vb + ui − 2,
where the ui are independent mean-zero normals with variance σ2u. We define σ
2
θ+u =
σ2θ +σ
2
u. Thus, the unexpected outcome, xi− va− vb+2, provides an unbiased signal of the
manager’s talent θi. In addition to the value created by the divisions’ date-0 production∑
i xi, additional value is created for the owner by the CEO in the next period. The date-1
payoff for the owner is assumed to be linear in the talent θ of the manager who is promoted
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to CEO, Mθ − Z. We refer to M > 1 as a span-of-control parameter; it is greater than 1
because promotion magnifies the impact of the manager’s talent on firm value. If the CEO
has at least as much effect on each division’s performance as the divisional manager, then
M ≥ 3. Of course, the CEO may also create value that is not division-specific.
The division managers choose whether to distort the use of corporate resources to add
some excess variance to the outcome x. Manager i can add noise si²i to the outcome, where
si ≥ 0, and where the ²i are standard normal, mutually independent, and independent
of the θi and ui. This choice is unobservable but, in equilibrium, the owner (correctly)
conjectures the choices of the managers. Adding risk s² increases the variance of x from
σ2θ+u to σ
2 = σ2θ+u + s
2; it is sometimes easier to think of the manager choosing σ rather
than choosing s.
A decision to add variance to x requires that the manager distort the use of the division’s
resources, thus reducing value. The assumption that variance can be manipulated at the
expense of mean performance is similar to that made by Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong
(2006) and by Cadenillas, Cvitanic, and Zapatero (2005) in related contexts.10 For example,
a manager may shift resources excessively from existing production to risky R&D initia-
tives, or may undertake organizational changes whose benefits are questionable and whose
outcomes are highly uncertain. Investment in marketable risky securities such as deriva-
tives can be used to increase volatility; if corporate resources including executive time and
attention are diverted to pursuing such strategies, they can decrease ex ante value. Each
unit increase in variance from resource misallocation is assumed to destroy a fixed fraction
δ of the project’s value. Because of this, a manager who is investing in both projects will
choose to distort project b rather than project a. The value lost is proportional to the excess
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variance and to the investment’s value:
δs2vb = δ(σ2 − σ2θ+u)vb, (1)
where δ is a positive parameter.11 Therefore, conditional on manager i’s strategy, the
division’s outcome is
xi = θi + va + vb(1− δs2i ) + ui + si²i − 2.
If si > 0, xi − va − vb(1− δs2i ) + 2 provides an unbiased but noisier signal of θi.
1.2 The promotion tournament
After managers make their choices at date 0, the random variables are realized, and the
owner observes the xi. Based on this, he updates each prior mean E[θi] = 0 to a posterior
mean, E1[θi] = θ¯1i. Given our assumptions, the ex ante distribution of the posterior mean
θ¯1i is normal, as is the posterior distribution of θi. The variance of θ¯1i will be greatest
if the managers’ equilibrium strategies add no noise; then the division’s performance xi
is maximally informative about manager i’s ability, inducing the greatest updating by the
owner.
Each of the risk-neutral managers would like to generate the highest posterior mean
in order to win the promotion contest. With more than two contestants, a manager can
increase his chance of winning if he can increase the variance of his posterior mean without
reducing the expected posterior mean. This makes it tempting to conclude that equilibrium
must have each si = 0, since this would yield the highest possible equilibrium variance of θ¯1i
(and would maximize E[xi]) if the owner observed the manager’s action. However, the owner
cannot observe the manager’s choice of variance. If the owner anticipates an equilibrium
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choice sˆi, his posterior mean assessment is
θ¯1i =
(
σ2θ
σ2θ+u + sˆ
2
i
)
[xi − va − vb(1− δsˆ2i ) + 2]. (2)
Taking the owner’s equilibrium conjecture as given, managers have an incentive to in-
crease the variance of x if doing so does not reduce the mean of x too much, even though
this will end up reducing the variance of θ¯1 in equilibrium. To see this, note that although
the owner believes xi is distributed as
xi ∼ θi + va + vb(1− δsˆ2i ) + ui + sˆi²i − 2,
manager i knows his choice si and therefore knows that the true distribution of xi is
xi ∼ θi + va + vb(1− δs2i ) + ui + si²i − 2.
Thus, the manager knows that the owner’s posterior belief is really
θ¯1i =
(
σ2θ
σ2θ+u + sˆ
2
i
)
[xi − va − vb(1− δsˆ2i ) + 2]
=
(
σ2θ
σ2θ+u + sˆ
2
i
)
[θi − (s2i − sˆ2i )δvb + ui + si²i].
A marginal increase in s2i increases the (true) variance of θ¯i, but at the cost of reducing its
expected value at rate δvb. The owner’s expectations affect the manager’s optimal choice
of risk by determining how the posterior mean will be calculated. In a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium, the owner is not fooled — his conjecture sˆi coincides with the manager’s optimal
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choice of si. Therefore, in equilibrium, the posterior mean is
θ¯1i =
(
σ2θ
σ2θ+u + sˆ
2
i
)
(θi + ui + sˆi²i), (3)
which is distributed normally with zero mean and with standard deviation σ2θ/
√
σ2θ+u + sˆ
2
i .
1.3 Wages
Although a division’s degree of success is not contractible (assumed for the reasons discussed
earlier), we suppose that there is a contractible variable correlated with x. This gives the
owner the opportunity to influence managerial risk taking through compensation, which
might be an efficient way to reduce the distortions caused by the promotion tournament.
Specifically, we assume there is a binary contracting variable y that indicates whether
the manager’s division is doing better than expected (a “success,” y = 1) or worse than
expected (a “failure,” y = 0). This provides a simple and tractable way to investigate
wage incentives. With probability α, the variable y reveals whether x is above or below the
mean E[x] = va + vb(1 − δvbsˆ2) − 2. With probability 1 − α, y is chosen randomly from
{0, 1}, with equal probabilities. If α = 0, x and y are uncorrelated; higher α means higher
correlation between x and y. Thus, y provides a more informative indicator of the manager’s
effectiveness when α is high. The chance of a good signal of divisional performance is
Pr[yi = 1] = E[yi] = (1− α)(1/2) + αPr[xi > E[xi | sˆi]]
= (1− α)(1/2) + αPr[θi + ui + si²i − δvb(s2i − sˆ2i ) > 0]. (4)
In equilibrium, y = 0 and y = 1 are equally likely because s = sˆ and the distribution of x
is symmetric.
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When α is positive, making a wage payment contingent on the contracting variable y
can influence risk taking because the managers care about expected wages as well as the
probability of winning the promotion prize Z. It is easy to see that the owner’s optimal
wage schedule would make no payment for a failure, y = 0; we use w to denote the wage
paid for a success, y = 1. In Section 3, we investigate the use of incentive wages to influence
behavior. In the sections following that, we assume α = 0 and concentrate on capital
allocation as a control method. (When α = 0, wages do not influence managerial choices,
so the owner optimally sets w = 0.)
1.4 Payoffs and equilibrium
Managers care about their expected wages and the probability of being promoted to CEO.
Let i∗ ∈ {1, 2, 3} be a random variable that denotes the manager who is promoted, i∗ =
argmaxi θ¯1i. (We ignore the zero-probability event of a tie.) Each manager, taking the
choices of other managers as given, chooses si to maximize
wPr[yi = 1] + Z Pr[i∗ = i] = wE[yi] + Z Pr[θ¯1i > max
j 6=i
θ¯1j ].
Let V0 =
∑
i E[xi − wyi] denote the expected value created by the divisions, and let
V1 =ME[θi∗ ]−Z be the expected value creation by the promoted CEO. The owner wishes
to maximize the total value created,
V0 + V1 =
∑
i
E[xi − wyi] +ME[θi∗ ]− Z.
Equilibrium requires that manager choices be optimal, owner inferences be rational, and
the owner’s wage policy and capital allocation be optimal.
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Definition 1 (Equilibrium.) A set {si, Gi, Ii, w} consisting of the managers’ choices si,
the owner’s inference rules Gi, and the owner’s capital allocation Ii, and incentive wage w
is an equilibrium if it satisfies the following conditions.
1. Each manager’s choice si maximizes his expected payoff wE[yi] + Z Pr[i∗ = i], taking
as given the owner’s inference rules and the strategies of the other managers.
2. The owner’s inference rules are consistent with Bayes’ rule when managers follow
their equilibrium strategies, i.e. Gi(θˆ | xi, Ii) = Pr[θi ≤ θˆ | xi, Ii, si] for each i.
3. The owner’s capital allocation and incentive wage {Ii, w} maximize total value V0+V1.
We concentrate on equilibria that are symmetric in that managers who are allocated the
same amount of capital choose identical strategies. In such equilibria, the owner’s expecta-
tions are identical for those divisions.
The ideal outcome for the owner occurs when the managers refrain from adding noise
without any capital restrictions or wage inducements. The owner provides a full allocation
of capital to each division, maximizing V0. In addition, the owner gets signals of θi that
are as informative as possible, so he can minimize the number of promotion errors — V1 is
as large as it can be. With the best signals of managerial ability, the average talent of the
new CEO works out to be
E[θi∗ ] =
3σ2θ
2
√
piσθ+u
, (5)
using the distribution of the first order statistic.12 Hence, under the first-best outcome,13
the firm’s value to the owner is
V0 + V1 = 3(va + vb − 2) + 3Mσ
2
θ
2
√
piσθ+u
− Z.
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We have assumed that there are three divisional managers. Suppose for a moment
that there were only two. Our first result shows that the promotion tournament produces
no distortions when only two managers compete — the owner can forgo wage payments
and provide full capital allocations because choosing s = 0 is a dominant strategy for the
managers. In this situation, adding variance would only reduce the probability of promotion
because the loss of δvbs2i would reduce the average θ¯1i.
Proposition 1 If there are only two managers, the unique equilibrium outcome has full
capital allocations, no wage payments, and no excess variance (Ii = 2, w = 0 and si = 0
for all i), so first best is achieved.
Proof. Omitted.
To see that setting si = 0 is a dominant strategy, first notice that in equilibrium (where
the other manager sets sj = 0), manager i gets a 50 percent chance of winning by choosing
si = 0. Any si > 0 would produce a lower chance of promotion because the loss of δvbs2i
would reduce the average θ¯1i. With only two contestants, a lower average θ¯1i means the
probability of winning is less than 50 percent, regardless of the variances of θ¯1i and θ¯1j .
On the other hand, if manager j does add variance, then setting si = 0 still maximizes
the manager’s chance of winning (with promotion probability higher than 50 percent). Since
the owner anticipates the same behavior from the two managers, manager i would produce
higher average θ¯1i if si is less than sj ; given this, the highest possible mean and lowest
possible variance will maximize his promotion probability. Setting si = 0 achieves both
goals.
Since it is a dominant strategy to add no excess variance, the only equilibrium has
s1 = s2 = 0. Each manager has a 50 percent chance of winning promotion, and the owner’s
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wealth is as high as it can possibly be.14
2. Tournament Incentives and Risk Taking
In this section, we examine how the tournament affects the operating/risk-taking choices of
managers, absent any wage incentives or capital rationing. That is, the owner makes a full
capital allocation I = 2 to each division, and the wage w is zero.
Posit an equilibrium in which the owner expects managers to add variance sˆ2, and define
σˆ2 = σ2θ+u+ sˆ
2 to be the equilibrium variance of x. We can simplify the analysis somewhat
because the owner anticipates identical behavior from the managers; this implies that the
manager with the highest realization xi will also be the one with the highest posterior mean
assessment θ¯1i [see (2)]. The equilibrium strategy generates x with mean va+vb(1−δsˆ2)−2
and variance σˆ2. Consider the position of an individual manager i, taking the choices sˆj
of the other two managers as given. Suppose manager i chooses noise s2i and thus total
variance σ2 = σ2θ+u + s
2. The difference between his mean and the others’ is δvb(σˆ2 − σ2),
and the difference in variances is σ2 − σˆ2. That is, if σ > σˆ, manager i’s mean is lower and
variance is higher.
The manager’s goal is to maximize the probability of promotion, which we denote W .
The manager wins if xi is greater than the other two xj . For either j, the distribution of
xi − xj is the distribution of
σγi − δvb(σ2 − σˆ2)− σˆγj ,
where γi and γj are independent standard normals. Therefore, manager i wins if
γi > max
j 6=i
{
σˆ
σ
γj + δvb(σ − σˆ2/σ)
}
= δvb(σ − σˆ2/σ) + σˆ
σ
max
j 6=i
γj .
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Since the density of maxj 6=i γj is 2Φ(γ)φ(γ), manager i chooses σ to maximize the probability
of winning,
W = 2
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ(γ)φ(γ)
{
1− Φ (δvb [σ − σˆ2/σ]+ γσˆ/σ)} dγ, (6)
which has derivative
∂W
∂σ
=
2σˆ
σ2
∫ ∞
−∞
γΦ(γ)φ(γ)φ
(
δvb
[
σ − σˆ2/σ]+ γσˆ/σ) dγ
−2δvb
(
1 + σˆ2/σ2
) ∫ ∞
−∞
Φ(γ)φ(γ)φ
(
δvb
[
σ − σˆ2/σ]+ γσˆ/σ) dγ. (7)
The first term in (7) is the increased likelihood of promotion due to the higher variance of
x and the second term is the decreased likelihood of promotion due to the lower mean of x.
The next proposition states that first best is achievable if δ, vb, σθ or σu is large enough.
Large δ and vb make it costly to add variance because doing so causes a large reduction in
the expected outcome. Large σθ and σu reduce the marginal benefit of the extra variance
on the probability of winning promotion.
Proposition 2 If δvbσθ+u ≥ 1/(2
√
3pi), then a first-best equilibrium is achievable. Man-
agers with full capital allocations add no excess variance when the owner expects each to
choose si = 0.
Proof. See appendix.
When δvbσθ+u is large enough, the promotion tournament induces no misallocation of
resources, so there is no problem to be resolved. Therefore, for the rest of the paper, we as-
sume that δvbσθ+u is sufficiently small that managers will inflate risk, absent countervailing
measures.
Standing Assumption 1 First best cannot be achieved: δvbσθ+u < 1/(2
√
3pi).
16
When δvbσθ+u is relatively small, an owner who expects no excess variance (he anticipates
σˆ = σθ+u) will be surprised, because the optimal response of each manager is then to inflate
risk. Figure 1 illustrates this for a particular example that has σθ+u = 0.5. In a proposed
equilibrium with no excess variance (σˆ = 0.5), a manager would choose to add risk until
σ ≈ 1.09, confounding the owner’s expectations.
Insert Figure 1 Here
The next proposition describes the unique symmetric equilibrium in the managers’ sub-
game under our standing assumption that first best is infeasible.
Proposition 3 Suppose the managers receive full capital allocations (I = 2) and no wages
(w = 0). The equilibrium of the managers’ subgame has σ = 1/(2
√
3piδvb) for each division.
This is the unique symmetric equilibrium. The excess variance s2 is decreasing in δ, vb, σθ
and σu.
Proof. See appendix.
The most interesting of the comparative statics in Proposition 3 is for σθ, the dispersion
in managerial talent. The distortions induced by the tournament are most severe when the
managers are likely to be very similar (σθ is small). Managers distort very aggressively when
they are in a “tight race” because that is when some extra variance might well change the
ranking — rank changes will seldom happen if the managers are likely disparate in ability.
Although it is rational for each manager to add variance to x, no advantage is gained in
equilibrium — each manager has a 1/3 chance of being promoted. But the manager must
follow the equilibrium strategy of distorting variance to avoid having a lower probability of
success than the other contestants. The promotion tournament creates inefficiency because
managers can add noise unobservably. The managers would lose nothing, and the owner
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would benefit, if they could jointly commit to choosing s = 0. However, if such an agreement
were in place, each manager would have the incentive to break the agreement to increase
his promotion probability (as shown in Figure 1), and the unobservability of s would allow
him to do so.
The excess variance hurts the owner in two ways. First, it directly reduces date-0 value
creation, V0, by 3s2δvb. Substituting the equilibrium s2 from Proposition 3, the loss of
initial value V0 due to distorted production is
∑
i
{1/(12piδvb)− σ2θ+uδvb} = 1/(4piδvb)− 3σ2θ+uδvb (8)
(which is positive by Standing Assumption 1). Second, it reduces future value creation
by the new CEO, V1, because promotion decisions are less efficient. The noise added to
the outcomes increases the likelihood that an inferior manager will be promoted to CEO.
Footnote 12 shows that the average talent of the new CEO is proportional to the standard
deviation of the posterior mean, σ(θ¯1i) = σ2θ/σ. The noise added by the managers makes
θ¯1i less sensitive to the outcome xi, reducing its standard deviation and thereby reducing
V1. Applying equation (34) using the equilibrium σ from Proposition 3, the value lost due
to inferior promotion decisions is
M
3
2
√
pi
(
σ2θ
σθ+u
− σ2θ(2
√
3piδvb)
)
=
(
3Mσ2θ
2
√
piσθ+u
)
(1− 2
√
3piδvbσθ+u),
also positive under Standing Assumption 1. These losses are more severe when M is large
(because promotion decisions are more important) and when δ, vb, and σu are small (because
the distortions are bigger).
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3. Wages and Risk Taking
In this section, we examine the use of contingent compensation to control managerial be-
havior. We assume the owner makes a full capital allocation I = 2 to each division. Under
our standing assumption that δvbσθ+u < 1/(2
√
3pi), the tournament characteristics of the
internal labor market prompt the managers to inflate risk in a futile effort to increase the
chance of promotion. Increasing risk from σθ+u to σmax ≡ 1/(2
√
3piδvb) reduces the mean
outcome for the division and degrades the owner’s promotion decisions, costing him money.
One possible remedy is for the owner to offer a wage payment when the contracting variable
y indicates good performance. Because any misuse of resources reduces x, it also reduces
the manager’s probability of receiving the wage.
Recall that the manager receives wage w when a good signal y = 1 is observed, and α
is the probability that the signal is actually informative rather than random. Manager i
chooses σi to maximize his expected payoff,
Πi = wPr[yi = 1] + Z Pr[i∗ = i] = wE[yi] + ZW (σi),
with E[yi] given by (4) and the promotion probability W (σi) defined by (6). An increase
in risk shifts the distribution of outcomes x to the left at a rate proportional to the extra
variance. This reduces the probability that y = 1, thereby reducing the manager’s expected
wage. Specifically,
∂
∂σ
wE[y] = −αwδvb
(
1 + σˆ2/σ2
)
φ
(
δvb
[
σ − σˆ2/σ]) < 0, (9)
proportional to α and δvb. This shows that incentive wages will be more powerful when
α is large (the contracting variable is more informative) and when δvb is large (extra risk
19
reduces wages more dramatically by causing a bigger shift in E[x]).
Combining (9) with (7), the marginal effect of higher risk on the manager’s expected
payoff is
∂Π
∂σ
= −αδvbw
(
1 + σˆ2/σ2
)
φ
(
δvb
[
σ − σˆ2/σ])
+
2σˆ
σ2
Z
∫ ∞
−∞
γΦ(γ)φ(γ)φ
(
δvb
[
σ − σˆ2/σ]+ γσˆ/σ) dγ
−2δvbZ
(
1 + σˆ2/σ2
) ∫ ∞
−∞
Φ(γ)φ(γ)φ
(
δvb
[
σ − σˆ2/σ]+ γσˆ/σ) dγ. (10)
Because σ = σˆ in equilibrium, we can evaluate (10) at σ = σˆ to get the first-order condition
∂Π
∂σ
=
1
2
√
3pi
(
1
σ
− 1
σmax
)
Z −
√
2αδvb√
pi
w = 0. (11)
Absent an incentive wage, the managers will choose σ = σmax, but a positive w will induce
them to add less risk, σ < σmax. By offering a large enough wage, the owner can induce
any desired risk level between σθ+u and σmax. To induce risk level σ, (11) implies that the
owner must offer wage
w =
(
1
2
√
3piσ
− δvb√
pi
) √
2piZ
2δvbα
=
Z√
2α
(
σmax
σ
− 1
)
. (12)
It is immediately clear from (12) that if α is small or Z is large, providing compensation
incentives will be too expensive: the wage cost is proportional to Z/α.
In equilibrium, each manager receives the wage payment half the time, yielding an
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average compensation cost of 3w/2 to the owner. The owner’s expected payoff is
V0 + V1 = 3E[x]− 3w/2 +ME[θi∗ ]− Z
= 3[va + vb(1− δ(σ2 − σ2θ+u))− 2]−
3Z
2
√
2α
(
σmax
σ
− 1
)
+
3Mσ2θ
2
√
piσ
− Z, (13)
and he chooses the wage w to maximize V0 + V1. The σ that the owner chooses to induce
may be interior or may be at either extreme, σθ+u or σmax.
Proposition 4 If either α is sufficiently small or Z is sufficiently large, the owner opti-
mally sets w = 0; providing wage incentives is too expensive. On the other hand, if α is
sufficiently large and Z is sufficiently small, an owner who provides full capital allocations
to all managers will offer wage incentives, setting w > 0.
Proof. See appendix.
When the promotion prize Z is large, the tournament-induced incentives to add risk are
very strong, making it too costly to provide countervailing wage incentives. When α is close
to zero, providing wage incentives is very inefficient because the link between performance
and wages (x and y) is weak. But if the tournament-induced incentives are not too strong
and wage contracts have a tight enough link to performance, the owner will offer some
incentive payments.
4. Capital Allocation
We now consider capital budgeting policy when the owner cannot achieve first best, to
see whether in equilibrium capital is rationed. As we saw earlier, the first best is not
achieved under our standing assumption that δvbσθ+u < 1/(2
√
3pi). We assume, henceforth,
that α = 0; since wages provide no incentives when α = 0, the owner will set w = 0.15
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This simplifies matters by allowing us to focus solely on capital allocation without adding
qualifications about optimal wages.
If the owner restricts division i’s capital to I = 1, and the manager adds noise si, the
division’s outcome is
xi = θi + va(1− δs2i ) + ui + si²i − 1.
There are two differences compared to the case of full capital allocations. The first is that
the value vb − 1 from project b is forfeited. The second is that each unit of variance added
by the manager destroys value δva rather than δvb; the misallocation of resources for a more
profitable project destroys more value.
However, since it is more costly to divert resources from a superior project, the manager
would add less noise when capital is rationed — perhaps no noise at all.16 A lesser degree
of risk-altering distortions under capital rationing has two positive effects on the owner’s
expected payoff. First, the manager utilizes corporate resources more efficiently, which en-
hances first-period value. Second, the division’s performance becomes more informative
about the manager’s talent. This improves the owner’s promotion decisions, thereby cre-
ating additional second-period value. We show that these two effects combined can more
than offset the sacrificed profits associated with project b. Thus, rationing is sometimes
beneficial.
Recall that the new CEO creates additional value after promotion, V1 = ME[θi∗ ] −
Z, where the multiplier M > 1 reflects the greater effect of managerial talent when the
manager’s span of control increases. Larger M implies that efficient promotion decisions
increase in importance relative to date-0 production efficiency. The next proposition states
the intuitive result that ifM is large enough, equilibrium involves some rationing of capital.
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Proposition 5 When the span-of-control parameter M is sufficiently large, the optimal
capital allocation has rationing (Ii = 1) for at least one division. If all divisions are rationed,
the managers add strictly less variance than under full capital allocations.
Proof. To see that rationing is efficient for large M , consider the policy of rationing
capital to all three divisions. This sacrifices all the potential first-period profits from project
b. However, the analysis of Section 2 implies that managers will add less variance under
such an allocation, so fewer promotion mistakes will be made. If va is large enough that
δvaσθ+u ≥ 1/(2
√
3pi), then the managers will add no excess variance when they are all
rationed: σ is simply σθ+u. If va is smaller, the rationed managers will add some variance,
but less than they would add with full capital allocations: σ will be 1/(2
√
3piδva), which
is smaller than σmax = 1/(2
√
3piδvb). For M sufficiently large, the increase in V1 swamps
the decrease in V0. Full capital allocations to all divisions is therefore a suboptimal scheme
when M is large.
4.1 Rationing all divisions
We see from Proposition 5 that rationing capital is sometimes an efficient solution when
managers can alter risk in unobservable ways. The optimal arrangement may even ration
capital to all divisions in order to generate the most precise information possible about
the ability of divisional managers; when M is large, this is definitely better than providing
full allocations of capital to all the managers. The next proposition compares these two
extremes in more detail: full allocations to all divisions versus rationing all divisions.
Proposition 6 When M is sufficiently large, rationing capital to each division is better
for the owner than providing full capital allocations. For a fixed value of M , rationing all
divisions is better if δ or vb is small enough.
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Proof. It is straightforward to verify that the change in total value V0+V1 from restricting
each division to one unit of capital instead of two is
−3(vb − 1) +
(
1
4piδvb
− 3σ2θ+uδvb
)
+
(
3Mσ2θ
2
√
piσθ+u
)
(1− 2
√
3piδvbσθ+u)
if va > 1/(2
√
3piδσθ+u), and is
−3(vb − 1) +
(
1
4piδvavb
+ 3δσ2θ+u
)
(va − vb) + 3
√
3δσ2θM(va − vb)
if va < 1/(2
√
3piδσθ+u). In either case, only the first of the three terms is negative; the
second and third are positive. Since the third term grows with M , the entire expression
is clearly positive when M is large. As δ ↓ 0, the second term explodes, also making the
expression positive. Finally, the expression is positive as vb ↓ 1 because the negative first
term vanishes.
As explained above, largeM favors rationing because more precise signals of θ add a lot
of value by improving promotion decisions. Small vb favors rationing because it means that
the project being sacrificed did not add much value anyway. Small δ induces managers to
add more variance when capital is not rationed (Proposition 3), and this favors rationing for
two reasons. First, the added variance reduces the value of project b, so rationing does not
forfeit as much date-0 value.17 Second, the extra variance reduces the quality of promotion
decisions, so the gain from eliminating the noise is greater. The parameter σu has the same
comparative statics as δ because small σu has these same two effects plus a third: it increases
the wealth achievable under first-best promotion decisions because there is less noise in the
owner’s observations, and this makes rationing more attractive. However, unlike δ and vb,
small σu alone is not enough to guarantee that rationing is better than full investment.18
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The comparative statics for σθ are ambiguous. Like δ, vb and σu, small σθ makes rationing
less costly because it forfeits less V0 wealth due to severe managerial distortions. However,
small σθ also means that the benefits of rationing (improved promotion decisions) are smaller
because the managers are likely to be very close in talent.
Risk distortions become more costly when the managers are rationed, as each unit of
excess variance destroys value δva instead of δvb. But rationing reduces the distortion s, and
the risk reductions are large enough that less value gets destroyed in equilibrium: δvas2 with
rationed capital is smaller than δvbs2 with full capital allocations. (This positive effect on
V0 is captured by the second term in the proof of Propostion 6.) The improved production
efficiency comes at the cost of forfeiting the NPV of project b, which directly reduces V0.
(This direct effect is captured by the first term in the proof.)
4.2 Partial rationing
Thus far, we have examined managerial behavior when the owner makes identical capital
allocations to all divisions, but it might be in the owner’s interest to ration only some of
the divisions. This subsection considers the case where one of the managers (manager 1) is
rationed and the other two get full allocations; similar logic applies to the case where two
of the three divisions are rationed. We continue to focus on equilibria that are symmetric
in the sense that the managers who receive identical capital allocations choose identical
strategies.
For this subsection only, we impose a tighter bound on δvbσθ+u than the bound in our
standing assumption. We now assume that
δvbσθ+u <
1
2(1 +
√
2)
√
pi
. (14)
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This tighter bound guarantees that the two types of equilibria in the next proposition are
the only possible equilibria.
Proposition 7 Assume that (14) holds and suppose the owner rations capital to division
1 only: I1 = 1, I2 = I3 = 2. Let σ1x = σ(x1) denote the risk of the rationed division, and
let σ2x = σ(x2) = σ(x3) denote the risk of the nonrationed divisions. Depending on the
parameters, the subgame equilibrium may have σ1x = σθ+u or σ1x > σθ+u; σ2x is always
greater than σθ+u. The owner (correctly) anticipates that managers will add risk as follows.
1. If manager 1 adds no variance, σ1x = σθ+u, the nonrationed managers add variance
such that σ2x = σθ+u/
√
K, where K is the unique real solution to
K(3 +K)− 2δvbσθ+u
√
pi(1 +K)(2 +K)
(√
1 +K +
√
2K
)
= 0. (15)
2. If manager 1 adds variance, then σ1x =
√
K/
(
δva
√
2pi(1 +K)(2 +K)
)
, and the
nonrationed managers add variance such that σ2x = σ1x/
√
K, where K is the unique
real solution to
√
K(3 +K)−
(
2
√
K +
√
2(1 +K)
) vb
va
= 0. (16)
Proof. See appendix.
When project a is good enough, the rationed manager adds no risk, but the nonrationed
managers do. In the case where all managers add risk, the nonrationed managers add more
risk, although this is far from obvious by a cursory inspection of equations in Proposition 7.
We state this as the next result.
Proposition 8 Assume that (14) holds. When one division is rationed and the others
receive full capital allocations, the nonrationed managers add strictly more risk than the
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rationed manager.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition for Proposition 8 is straightforward. Managers with full capital allocations
can add noise by distorting project b, with expected loss of profits δvbs2. Managers who are
rationed must distort project a when adding noise, reducing profits at a faster rate — δva
per unit of variance. This makes it natural to expect managers with full allocations to add
at least as much noise as rationed managers. One might imagine that if for some reason
the owner expected the nonrationed managers to add less risk, the managers would in fact
behave that way. Our proposition shows that this does not happen.
Partial rationing reduces risk distortion by enough amount so that the rationed division
always waste less date-0 value although each unit of excess variance destroys more value.
This is obviously true when the rationed manager adds no variance. In the case 2 of
Proposition 7 when the rationed manager adds variance s21 and the nonrationed managers
add variance s22,
δvbs
2
2 − δvas21 = δσ2θ+u(va − vb) + δvaσ21
(
3−K −√2K(1 +K)
2K +
√
2K(1 +K)
)
.
Note that 0 < K < 1 by Proposition 8. Over this interval, 3 − K −√2K(1 +K) > 0.
Thus, δvas21 < δvbs
2
2, i.e., the rationed division destorys less date-0 value.
Differential capital allocations affect the promotion tournament in a surprising way, as
our next result shows.
Proposition 9 Assume that (14) holds and suppose the owner rations capital to division
1 only. The probability that manager 1 is promoted is greater than 1/3, and the probability
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that each of the other managers is promoted is less than 1/3.
Proof. See appendix.
The manager who is rationed is more likely to be promoted even though all managers
are identical ex ante and each is maximizing his probability of promotion. Because rationing
induces manager 1 to add less noise to divisional performance, the owner’s ex post estimate
of his talent is more variable, so it is more likely that he is evaluated to be the best (or
worst) of the three. In contrast to models of empire-building managers, the managers here
would volunteer to be the one who is rationed.19
It is also interesting that typical accounting measures of performance are likely to in-
dicate that division 1 has the best performance. For example, suppose project a is better
than project b because the project investment I = 1 generates more revenue and a higher
profit margin. Then the expected asset turnover, profit margin, return on assets and ratio
of market value to book value would all be higher for division 1 than for the other divi-
sions. Even if the three managers have identical talent (and even though the divisions have
identical investment opportunities), the most likely outcome is that the rationed manager
is promoted and that accounting measures of performance make this division appear the
most successful.
Things would be more complicated if the divisions were not identical, but it is still
plausible that one would see the manager of the best division promoted more frequently
even if the managers have identical talent. For motivation, consider the setting of Harris and
Raviv (1996), where the efficient way of coping with information asymmetries is to give the
worst division excess capital and ration the best division. Our logic suggests that managers
of poorer divisions would then (rationally) add more noise, and managers of better divisions
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would add less noise. The result is that, even when the true talent levels are identical, better
divisions are more likely to produce the new CEO.
4.3 Rationing versus wage
Throughout this section, we have assumed that wages are impotent for controlling risk
distortions (α = 0). In general, the cost to the owner of providing wage incentives depends
on Z/α, as was shown in Section 3. The cost to the owner of controlling risk distortions
by rationing capital is independent of both Z and α; the cost he bears is the foregone
profits from project b. For this reason, rationing is particularly important when tournament
considerations loom large (Z is big), which motivates us to focus primarily on the capital
allocation mechanism rather than the wage mechanism.
In general, rationing will be more attractive to the owner if Z is large, α is small or vb is
fairly close to 1. Wage incentives will be more attractive if Z/α is small or vb is large.20 If
Z/α is large (obviating wages) and vb is large (obviating rationing), the owner will choose
to live with the extra risk, allowing the managers to set σ = σmax.
5. Extensions
In this section, we discuss some possible extensions of our basic model. We consider the
effects of risk-altering investment distortions on optimal organizational scope, the effects
of possible cross-firm promotions of managers, and the potential advantages to a firm of
committing to narrow the set of contenders for the CEO position.
5.1 Organizational scope
In this paper, we have taken the structure of the firm as given and have shown how competi-
tion among divisional managers for the CEO slot produces inefficiencies when the candidates
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can unobservably alter risks. For modeling simplicity, we considered only three divisions,
but even greater distortions would result from a larger pool of contenders. Figure 2 il-
lustrates how risk taking changes as the number of divisions increases, using the example
parameters from Figure 1.21
Insert Figure 2 Here
Our analysis suggests some implications about whether divisions should be combined
within a firm (and how many) or should stand apart. There are other factors that may make
the conglomerate form desirable or undesirable, but our model points out an interesting
trade-off that arises from learning about the talent of the divisional managers. Consider
the situation where the only advantage of a conglomerate over a group of stand-alone firms
is that it allows an especially talented CEO to take value-creating actions in a broader
domain — one can have Jack Welch manage the entire enterprise rather than having Jack
Welch manage one division and several lesser lights manage the others. This suggests that
conglomerates should have many divisions.
However, having more divisions in the firm induces greater strategic distortions by the
managers who hope to be the next CEO. This is costly due to lost value from suboptimal
operating decisions by the divisions (and perhaps due to capital rationing to reduce such
distortions), and also because the additional noise makes promotion decisions less efficient.
In the simple setting of our model, these distortions can be avoided completely by lim-
iting the firm to one or two divisions (Proposition 1). This generates the best possible
operating decisions without rationing capital and without distorting promotion decisions.22
Unfortunately, it also limits the scope of influence of exceptional CEOs.
For instance, in our setting with three divisions, one could organize operations as the
three-division conglomerate of the model or as three separate “focused” firms.23 Assume
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that theM and Z of the model are nowM/3 and Z/3 for each of the focused firms.24 When
all managers have full capital allocations, date-0 production is efficient for the focused
organization, avoiding the loss of V0 value calculated in (8), 1/(4piδvb) − 3σ2θ+uδvb. The
drawback of focus is that the average talent of the three new CEOs is just the average
talent of the pool of divisional managers, namely zero. With the conglomerate structure,
the average talent is E[θi∗ ] = 3
√
3σ2θδvb, increasing the V1 value by 3
√
3Mσ2θδvb.
Combining these pieces, the value difference between the conglomerate and the focused
organization works out to
3
√
3Mσ2θδvb −
(
1
4piδvb
− 3σ2θ+uδvb
)
. (17)
This implies that large values ofM , σθ, σu, δ, and vb favor conglomeration, and small values
of these parameters favor focus.25 The finding is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 10 The net benefit to conglomeration is increasing in the span of control M ,
the uncertainty about managerial ability σθ, the fundamental noise σu, the value loss from
distortion δ, and the payoff on the inferior project vb.
Large values of the first two parameters favor conglomeration for fundamental reasons.
Large M implies that there is a lot to be gained by giving the best manager a greater span
of control. Similarly, large σθ means there are large talent differences among managers;
conglomeration (usually) allows the best manager to control the entire organization rather
than leaving most of it to be run by significantly inferior managers.
Large values of the last three parameters favor conglomeration because of their effects
on managerial risk taking. Large δ and vb make it costlier for managers to add variance,
so promotion decisions in a conglomerate are not distorted so severely. Large σu has the
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same effect, but indirectly. When the fundamental shock u has high variance, the owner’s
rule for revising estimated managerial talent is less sensitive to performance, making it less
tempting for managers to unobservably add variance. As a result, promotion mistakes in
conglomerates are not so much worse than in focused organizations.
Familiar measures would provide plausible empirical proxies for some of the parameters.
For instance, one could use the variance of earnings or of return on assets as a proxy for
σ2u. Higher variance then suggests more benefits from conglomeration, quite apart from any
desire for diversification. The parameter vb captures the profitability of the marginal project
that is a candidate for rationing. Recalling that the required investment in the model has
been standardized to 1, and that vb is the value of the project, Tobin’s q is the obvious
empirical proxy. Ceteris paribus, higher-q firms would have less managerial distortion and
would therefore gain more from conglomeration.
Certainly one factor producing variation in firm performance within an industry is the
ability of managers. So measures of cross-firm performance variability for an industry are
possible proxies for the industry’s σ2θ , the variance of managerial talent. The model then
predicts that industries where performance is more homogeneous will tend to have more
focused firms, and industries with more variation will tend to have more conglomerates.
Our approach suggests that conglomerates will form when the benefits of learning about
managerial ability are greatest, and when the costs of rationing current capital are lowest.
It is plausible that managerial ability is most valuable for growth projects in which the
strategies needed to maximize profitability have not yet been reduced to routines.26 Our
model suggests that when the gains that accrue to learning about managerial ability decline,
firms will increase their focus by selling divisions and by engaging in spin-offs or equity
carve-outs. This implies that a firm that has relatively few growth opportunities will tend
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to engage in refocusing activity, e.g., by executing a leveraged buyout and selling off noncore
assets (Jensen 1986).
The span-of-control parameter M measures the importance of CEO talent for firm per-
formance. In a competitive labor market, one would expect this to be reflected in executive
compensation. Controlling for other factors known to influence CEO compensation, high
residual compensation in an industry is a possible proxy for high M . The implication of
our model is then that conglomeration is more attractive in industries with positive residual
compensation and focus is more attractive in industries with negative residual compensa-
tion.
5.2 Internal and external labor markets
Our model focuses on competition for promotion within the firm. Of course, in addition
to this internal labor market, there is an external market for CEOs. One can imagine
that the owner compares the estimated talent (and cost) of the best internal candidate
with the estimated talent (and cost) of external candidates when choosing the new CEO.
Limited ability to observe performance across firms will limit learning about managers’
abilities, so that the managerial labor market cannot re-assort managers to firms perfectly
in the next period. But as long as there is some observability, managers will be in a
spontaneous cross-firm tournament in which better managers will be hired next period for
more important projects. Our approach suggests that this open-market tournament will
sometimes be associated with inefficient choice of project variance and capital rationing
as managers try to reach the upper tail of the performance distribution. Although in our
model, distortions are absent from a firm with one or two divisions, an external labor market
would upset this happy outcome.
So, both limits on cross-firm observability and project choice distortions make it costly
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to organize stand-alone divisions as firms. Greater within-firm observability provides a
simple reason to form conglomerates, in addition to the span-of-control reason in Section
5.1.
5.3 Narrowing the field of contender
When there is interest in CEO succession, the board of directors sometimes makes it clear
that a few internal candidates are on the “inside track” for the top job. It may seem peculiar
to eliminate potential CEO candidates who could turn out to be great CEOs. Our model
suggests that such an announcement can maximize shareholder wealth even when the firm
is satisfied with the performance of the eliminated candidates. For example, in our setting
with only three divisions, an announcement that narrows the field of CEO contenders from
three to two eliminates the incentives of all managers to distort production in order to
add variance (Proposition 1). Thus, narrowing the field avoids the losses due to inefficient
production quantified in (8) and also provides the owner with the most precise possible
signals of the talent of managers 1 and 2, making it more likely that the new CEO will be
the more talented of the two. The benefits of eliminating one contender will be large when
δ, vb, and σu are small, because that is when managers distort very aggressively.
The drawback of eliminating a manager from consideration is that one third of the time,
that manager is the one who would have been the best CEO. This drawback looms large
when σθ is big, i.e., when there are likely to be substantial talent differences among the
managers. Thus, a decision to narrow the field of contenders will hurt the owner when σθ is
large (eliminating a manager forfeits a lot of potential CEO value) and also when δ, vb, and
σu are large (managers are not distorting very much, so little value is added by eliminating
the excess risk). Narrowing the field may help the owner in the opposite circumstances.27
Of course, maintaining a narrowed-field policy raises the issue of time consistency. Sup-
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pose the field has been narrowed to managers 1 and 2, but then division 3 turns in outstand-
ing performance, leading the owner to conclude that manager 3 would be the best CEO.
The owner then wishes to renege on the previous announcement and promote manager 3.
But if the owner will, in fact, renege when it is convenient, and the managers understand
this, then the initial announcement will not have its desired effect. When the horse race is
narrowed to two, everyone will behave as if there are still three horses in the race because,
in fact, there are three horses in the race.
One effective method of committing to a narrow field of candidates is to write in their
compensation contracts a guarantee that one of the two will succeed the current CEO. This
tactic was recently employed at Viacom, where Tom Freston and Leslie Moonves had clauses
in their contracts ensuring that one of them would succeed Sumner Redstone (Flint 2004).
6. Conclusion
We have presented a model in which three divisional managers with unknown ability com-
pete for promotion to CEO. The owner uses divisional performance to assess management
talent, and managers can unobservably add variance to the division’s operations by divert-
ing resources from their best use. Increasing the variance of the distribution is an attempt to
improve the chance of being the top-ranked manager. The distortions are very pronounced
if there is likely to be a tight race for succession, i.e., if the variance of management talent
is small. The excess variance creates inefficiencies in production and inefficiencies in pro-
motion, since the additional noise makes it more difficult for the owner to determine which
manager is most talented.
When the payoff for winning the promotion tournament is not too large and there is
a contractible variable sufficiently correlated with divisional performance, incentive wages
can be used to reduce these inefficiencies. But when tournament incentives are pronounced
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or the contracting variable is noisy, using capital allocation is a better avenue.
Rationing capital to one or more divisions can be an efficient way to alleviate these
distortions. When capital is rationed, the manager invests in only the best projects, making
it more costly to divert resources. Managers who are rationed therefore add less variance,
so production is more efficient and also more informative about manager talent, leading to
better promotion decisions. Rationing is more likely to be optimal when the CEO position
is relatively more crucial (compared to divisional management), because that is when the
superior information is most valuable. If there is uncertainty about when succession will
occur — this is outside our model — rationing will be more useful when there is a high
probability that the CEO will be replaced in the near future, because that is when division
managers have the strongest incentive to inflate risk. The problem is less severe if the
current CEO is relatively young and is performing well, making it likely that he will be in
office for a long time to come.28
Our analysis offers several empirical implications and implications for managerial policy.
Although the managers are identical ex ante, and the divisions have identical investment
opportunities, we find that the managers of divisions that are rationed are more likely to
be promoted to CEO than the managers of fully funded divisions.
Two benefits of conglomeration are that a highly talented CEO can create value in a
broader domain, and that there is likely to be greater within-firm observability of manage-
rial performance. A cost is that a promotion tournament in a conglomerate with many
contending divisional managers creates a strong incentive for managers to distort risk. This
in turn increases the need for capital rationing to control this distortion. We derive several
comparative statics predictions about the kinds of firms that will diversify or engage in
focusing transactions such as spin-offs or equity carve-outs.
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Owners can sometimes benefit by following the common practice of narrowing the field
for possible promotion to CEO. The obvious drawback is that such a policy rules out po-
tentially desirable candidates, but this is sometimes outweighed by the benefit of weakening
the incentives to distort risk. This in turn reduces the need for owners to ration capital.
Our analysis has focused on a firm in which there is a single stage of promotion, from
division manager to CEO. However, in large organizations there are many layers of bureau-
cracy, and promotion to one level gives the manager entry to a contest for promotion to
the next.29 Our approach suggests that capital rationing is likely to be compounded at
different levels of the hierarchy; a divisional manager may ration his subordinates’ capital
not only because the capital available to the division is rationed, but to control the behavior
of managers within the division. The introduction of further rationing may serve the useful
purposes of limiting risk distortion within the division and generating better information
about the quality of competing intra-divisional managers.
Mandatory rotation schemes in which managers regularly are shifted between divisions
have the effect of widening the tournament in the sense that a manager may have the
opportunity to participate in tournaments to head more than one division. Previous authors
have suggested that such schemes can be beneficial for controlling agency problems on the
part of divisional managers.30 Our approach suggests an offsetting cost to mandatory
rotation schemes. Widening the scope of promotion tournaments intensifies incentives for
risk manipulation by managers. To some extent, the firm can control this problem by
rationing capital more severely, but this is also costly. Thus, our approach helps explain
why some large firms lack mandatory rotation policies. It further suggests that those firms
utilizing mandatory rotation will have greater capital rationing; and that such firms are
likely to have poorer growth opportunities, since rationing of capital is less costly if good
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uses for capital are limited. More broadly, extensions of our approach are likely to have a
rich set of implications for the relation between the structure of promotion opportunities
within organizations, growth opportunities, and capital rationing.
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Figure
Figure 1
Manager’s optimization if owner expects no excess variance
The figure plots the manager’s probability of winning the promotion tournament, W , as a
function of his choice σ, assuming that the owner anticipates no excess variance (σˆ = σθ+u)
and that the other managers are adding no excess variance. It is in the manager’s interest
to add variance, raising σ to 1.09, confounding the owner’s expectations. The parameters
for this example are σ2θ = σ
2
u = δ = 1/8 and vb = 5/4.
Figure 2
Risk taking as a function of the number of divisions
The figure plots the equilibrium value of σ as a function of the number of managers in the
promotion tournament, assuming all divisions receive full capital allocations. The figure is
based on the parameters given in Figure 1. The model considered in the paper has n = 3,
with the resulting σ = 1.0424. When there are more divisions, risk taking is more extreme.
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Appendix
A Properties of Gaussian Distributions
The following properties of the standard normal distribution are used in our results. Φ(·) represents
the standard normal distribution function and φ(·) represents the standard normal density.
∫ ∞
−∞
γΦ(γ)φ(γ)φ(
√
Kγ) dγ =
1
2pi(1 +K)
√
2 +K
(18)∫ ∞
−∞
Φ(γ)φ(γ)φ(
√
Kγ) dγ =
1
2
√
2pi
√
1 +K
(19)∫ ∞
−∞
γΦ
(
γ√
K
)
φ(γ)φ
(
γ√
K
)
dγ =
K
2pi(1 +K)
√
2 +K
(20)∫ ∞
−∞
Φ
(
γ√
K
)
φ(γ)φ
(
γ√
K
)
dγ =
√
K
2
√
2pi
√
1 +K
(21)∫ ∞
−∞
γΦ(
√
Kγ)[φ(γ)]2 dγ =
√
K
4pi
√
2 +K
(22)∫ ∞
−∞
Φ(
√
Kγ)[φ(γ)]2 dγ = 1/(4
√
pi) (23)∫ ∞
−∞
γ2Φ(γ)[φ(γ)]2 dγ = 1/(8
√
pi) (24)∫ ∞
−∞
γ3Φ(γ)[φ(γ)]2 dγ = 1/(3
√
3pi) (25)∫ ∞
−∞
γΦ(γ)2φ(γ) dγ = 1/(2
√
pi) (26)
B Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 2 and Proposition 3: These propositions make statements about the
symmetric equilibrium in the managers’ subgame when they receive full capital allocations and
no wages. Proposition 2 considers the case δvbσθ+u > 1/(2
√
3pi) and Proposition 3 considers the
opposite case. We first we show that each manager has a finite optimal response σ∗ = σ∗(σˆ)
that maximizes his chance of promotion, taking the owner’s conjecture σˆ and the other managers’
behavior σj = σˆ as given. We then solve for the symmetric equilibrium and establish the other
properties stated in the propositions.
For given owner conjecture σˆ, a manager chooses his own σ to maximize his promotion probability
W (σ) given by (6). The function W (σ) has the following properties that hold for any given σˆ:
• It is continuous and differentiable in σ.
• It is bounded: 0 < W (σ) ≤ 1.
• limσ→∞W (σ) = 0.31
These properties together guarantee the existence of a finite optimal response σ∗(σˆ) ≥ σθ+u that
maximizes W (σ).
Equilibrium requires that managerial choices confirm the owner’s conjectures: the equilibrium
σˆ satisfies σ∗(σˆ) = σˆ. There are two possibilities for the symmetric equilibrium: either σ = σθ+u or
σ is an interior solution. An interior solution must satisfy the first-order condition ∂W/∂σ|σ=σˆ = 0.
40
The expression for ∂W/∂σ in (7) simplifies greatly when evaluated at σ = σˆ, using properties (22)
and (23) of the standard normal distribution:
∂W
∂σ
∣∣∣∣
σ=σˆ
= 1/(2
√
3piσ)− δvb/
√
pi.
If δvbσθ+u ≥ 1/(2
√
3pi), then ∂W/∂σ|σ=σˆ < 0 for all σ > σθ+u. This means that σ = σθ+u is
the only possible equilibrium for these parameters. The owner anticipates no excess variance, and
it is optimal for each manager to add no variance, as claimed in Proposition 2.
If δvbσθ+u < 1/(2
√
3pi), the first-order condition is
1/(2
√
3piσ)− δvb/
√
pi = 0,
which gives σ = 1/(2
√
3piδvb). Checking the second derivative shows that this point is a maximum,
not a minimum, as follows. Defining h(γ, σ) = δvb[σ − σˆ2/σ] + γσˆ/σ, the second derivative of W is
∂2W
∂σ2
= −2
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ(γ)φ(γ)φ(h(γ, σ))
[
∂2h(γ, σ)
∂σ2
− h(γ, σ)
(
∂h(γ, σ)
∂σ
)]
dγ.
When evaluated at σ = σˆ, tedious calculations reduce this to −2
(
1
6
√
3piσ2
− δ2v2b√
3pi
)
, which is negative
at σ = 1/(2
√
3piδvb). So when δvbσθ+u < 1/(2
√
3pi), there is a unique symmetric equilibrium and this
equilibrium has σ = 1/(2
√
3piδvb). The corresponding excess variance is s2 = (2
√
3piδvb)−2 − σ2θ+u,
which is decreasing in δ, vb, σθ and σu, as claimed in Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 4: We first prove that we have forfeited no generality by assuming that
the manager’s wage depends only on that division’s outcome, rather than the outcomes of all three
divisions. Consider a wage contract w(yi, y−i) that pays manager i based on all the outcomes.
Given the owner’s expectations σˆ, the expected payoff for manager i if he chooses σi and the other
managers choose σ−i is
E[w(yi, y−i) | σi, σ−i, σˆ] + Z ·W (σi | σ−i, σˆ).
In order for the equilibrium strategy to be optimal, choosing σi = σˆi must maximize this payoff,
taking as given the choices of the other managers σ−i = σˆ−i and the owner’s conjecture σˆ. That is,
for every possible σi, we must have
E[w(yi, y−i) | σˆi, σˆ−i, σˆ] + Z ·W (σˆi | σˆ−i, σˆ) ≥ E[w(yi, y−i) | σi, σˆ−i, σˆ] + Z ·W (σi | σˆ−i, σˆ).
One can rewrite the manager’s expected wage as
E[w(yi, y−i) | σi, σ−i, σˆ] =
∫
w(yi, y−i)f(yi, y−i | σi, σ−i, σˆ)dy
=
∫ {∫
w(yi, y−i)f(y−i | σ−i, σˆ)dy−i
}
f(yi | σi, σˆ)dyi
Now use the conditional expectation in the braces to define a new contract w˜ that depends on only
yi, taking as given the equilibrium strategies of the other divisions:
w˜(yi) =
∫
w(yi, y−i)f(y−i | σˆ−i, σˆ)dy−i.
Under this simpler contract, the optimality condition for manager i’s equilibrium strategy choice is
exactly the same as under the original contract. Namely, for every possible choice σi, it must be
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that ∫ {∫
w(yi, y−i)f(y−i | σˆ−i, σˆ)dy−i
}
f(yi | σˆi, σˆ)dyi + Z ·W (σˆi | σˆ−i, σˆ)
≥
∫ {∫
w(yi, y−i)f(y−i | σˆ−i, σˆ)dy−i
}
f(yi | σi, σˆ)dyi + Z ·W (σi | σˆ−i, σˆ).
This proves that it is valid to restrict attention to wage contracts that depend on the outcome for
that manager’s division alone.
To prove the conclusions in the proposition, we use the owner’s expected payoff V0 + V1 given
in (13). A marginal increase in the wage w will reduce the equilibrium σ; differentiating (13) gives
−∂(V0 + V1)
∂σ
=
3
σ2
(
2δvbσ3 − Zσ
max
2
√
2α
+
Mσ2θ
2
√
pi
)
.
The first term captures the improved profits from first-period production, the second term captures
the additional wage cost, and the third term captures the additional value from better promotion
decisions.
The optimal wage depends on the size of Z and α. If Z is small enough and α large enough that
Z
α
≤ 4
√
6piδvb
[
2δvb(σθ+u)3 +
M
2
√
pi
σ2θ
]
,
then we have a corner solution: the owner offers a wage large enough that managers add no risk,
i.e., w = Z√
2α
(
σmax
σθ+u
− 1
)
> 0 and σ = σθ+u. When Z/α satisfies
4
√
6piδvb
[
2δvb(σθ+u)3 +
M
2
√
pi
σ2θ
]
<
Z
α
< 4
√
6piδvb
[
2δvb(σmax)3 +
M
2
√
pi
σ2θ
]
, (27)
the owner sets w = Z√
2α
(
σmax
σ − 1
)
> 0, where the corresponding equilibrium risk-taking level σ
solves the first-order condition
2δvbσ3 − Zσ
max
2
√
2α
+
Mσ2θ
2
√
pi
= 0.
Given (27), the equilibrium σ lies between σθ+u and σmax in this case. Finally, consider the situation
when Z is large enough or α is small enough that
Z
α
≥ 4
√
6piδvb
[
2δvb(σmax)3 +
M
2
√
pi
σ2θ
]
.
In this case, it is straightforward to verify that the owner’s payoff decreases monotonically with the
wage, so the owner will optimally set w = 0 and the managers will choose σ = σmax.
Proof of Proposition 7: The proposition characterizes equilibrium in the managers’ subgame when
only division 1 is rationed. The prior means of manager talent are all zero: θ¯01 = θ¯02 = θ¯03 = 0.
The divisional outcomes are
x1 = θ1 + va(1− δs21) + u1 + s1²1 − 1,
x2 = θ2 + va + vb(1− δs22) + u2 + s2²2 − 2,
x3 = θ3 + va + vb(1− δs23) + u3 + s3²3 − 2.
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Upon observing the outcomes xi, the owner’s posterior mean estimates of manager ability are
θ¯11 =
σ2θ
σ2θ+u + sˆ
2
1
[
x1 − va(1− sˆ21δ) + 1
]
=
σ2θ
σ2θ+u + sˆ
2
1
[θ1 + u1 + s1²1 − δva(s21 − sˆ21)], (28)
θ¯12 =
σ2θ
σ2θ+u + sˆ
2
2
[x2 − va − vb(1− sˆ22δ) + 2] =
σ2θ
σ2θ+u + sˆ
2
2
[θ2 + u2 + s2²2 − δvb(s22 − sˆ22)], (29)
θ¯13 =
σ2θ
σ2θ+u + sˆ
2
3
[x3 − va − vb(1− sˆ23δ) + 2] =
σ2θ
σ2θ+u + sˆ
2
3
[θ3 + u3 + s3²3 − δvb(s23 − sˆ23)]. (30)
Each manager chooses si to maximize the probability that θ¯1i = maxj{θ¯1j}. It is more convenient
to solve the problem in terms of σi and σˆi rather than si and sˆi, where σ2i = σ
2
θ+u + s
2
i and σˆ
2
i =
σ2θ+u + sˆ
2
i . In a symmetric equilibrium, the owner expects identical behavior from the nonrationed
managers: σˆ2 = σˆ3.
The nonrationed managers
In a symmetric equilibrium, managers 2 and 3 will make identical choices. We present manager
2’s optimization; manager 3’s problem is analogous. Manager 2 wins promotion if and only if θ¯12
is bigger than both θ¯11 and θ¯13. Referring to (28)–(30), the posterior means have the following
distributions, where the γi are independent standard normals:
θ¯11 ∼
(
σ2θ
σˆ21
)[
σ1γ1 − δva(σ21 − σˆ21)
]
θ¯12 ∼
(
σ2θ
σˆ22
)[
σ2γ2 − δvb(σ22 − σˆ22)
]
θ¯13 ∼
(
σ2θ
σˆ23
)[
σ3γ3 − δvb(σ23 − σˆ23)
]
.
Since σˆ2 = σˆ3 and manager 2 expects the other managers to follow the equilibrium strategies, he
anticipates winning promotion if(
σ2θ
σˆ22
)
σ2γ2 − δvbσ2θ
(
σ22
σˆ22
− 1
)
>
σ2θ
σˆ1
γ1 and
(
σ2θ
σˆ22
)
σ2γ2 − δvbσ2θ
(
σ22
σˆ22
− 1
)
>
σ2θ
σˆ2
γ3,
that is if
γ2 > max
{
σˆ22
σˆ21
σˆ1
σ2
γ1,
σˆ2
σ2
γ3
}
+ δvb
(
σ2 − σˆ
2
2
σ2
)
= max
{
1
K
σˆ1
σ2
γ1,
σˆ2
σ2
γ3
}
+ δvb
(
σ2 − σˆ
2
2
σ2
)
,
where K is defined as σˆ21/σˆ
2
2 .
Because the density of z = max{γ1/A, γ3/B} is AΦ(Bz)φ(Az) +BΦ(Az)φ(Bz), the probability
of promotion for manager 2 is
W2 =
∫ ∞
−∞
{
K
σ2
σˆ1
Φ
(
σ2
σˆ2
z
)
φ
(
K
σ2
σˆ1
z
)
+
σ2
σˆ2
Φ
(
K
σ2
σˆ1
z
)
φ
(
σ2
σˆ2
z
)}
×
{
1− Φ
(
z + δvb
(
σ2 − σˆ
2
2
σ2
))}
dz.
Breaking apart the two pieces and applying simple linear transformations produces
W2 =
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ
(
γ√
K
)
φ(γ)
[
1− Φ
(
1
K
σˆ1
σ2
γ + δvb
(
σ2 − σˆ
2
2
σ2
))]
dγ
+
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ(
√
Kγ)φ(γ)
[
1− Φ
(
σˆ2
σ2
γ + δvb
(
σ2 − σˆ
2
2
σ2
))]
dγ. (31)
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In the proof of Proposition 8, Lemma 1 shows that the nonrationed managers will choose positive
s, not s = 0, so σ2 > σθ+u. This means that ∂W2/∂σ2 must be equal to zero. Equilibrium also
requires that σ2 = σˆ2, which yields the following condition:
0 =
1
σˆ1
∫ ∞
−∞
γΦ
(
γ√
K
)
φ(γ)φ
(
γ√
K
)
dγ − 2δvb
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ
(
γ√
K
)
φ(γ)φ
(
γ√
K
)
dγ
+
1
σˆ2
∫ ∞
−∞
γΦ(
√
Kγ)[φ(γ)]2 dγ − 2δvb
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ(
√
Kγ)[φ(γ)]2 dγ.
Applying (20)–(23) produces
K
2pi(1 +K)
√
2 +Kσˆ1
− δvb
√
K√
2pi
√
1 +K
+
√
K
4pi
√
2 +Kσ2
− δvb
2
√
pi
= 0. (32)
Recall that K = σˆ21/σˆ
2
2 .
In the case where manager 1 adds no variance, σˆ1 = σθ+u and σ2 = σθ+u/
√
K can be substituted
into (32). This substitution and some algebra gives equation (15), the implicit definition of K in
Part 1 of Proposition 7. K ≥ 0 is required for the left hand side of (15) to be real, and the proof of
Lemma 1 shows that (15) requires K < 1. Tedious calculations show that there exists a unique K
that satisfies (15), with 0 < K < 1, so Part 1 of the proposition is proved.
In the case where manager 1 does add variance, we must determine the optimal choice σ1 and
that, together with (32), will characterize the equilibrium with differential capital allocations.
The rationed manager
Manager 1 faces two rivals who behave identically. Using the same logic as in the previous
subsection, manager 1 wins promotion if(
σ2θ
σˆ21
)
σ1γ1 − δvaσ2θ
(
σ21
σˆ21
− 1
)
>
σ2θ
σˆ2
γ2 and
(
σ2θ
σˆ21
)
σ1γ1 − δvaσ2θ
(
σ21
σˆ21
− 1
)
>
σ2θ
σˆ2
γ3,
that is if
γ1 >
(
σˆ21
σˆ22
)(
σˆ2
σ1
)
max{γ2, γ3}+ δva
(
σ1 − σˆ
2
1
σ1
)
= K
σˆ2
σ1
max{γ2, γ3}+ δva
(
σ1 − σˆ
2
1
σ1
)
.
Because the density of z = max{γ2, γ3} is 2Φ(z)φ(z), the probability of promotion for manager
1 is
W1 = 2
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ(z)φ(z)
{
1− Φ
(
K
σˆ2
σ1
z + δva
(
σ1 − σˆ
2
1
σ1
))}
dz.
If va is large enough, manager 1 maximizes W1 by adding no variance: s21 = 0 so σ
2
1 = σ
2
θ+u. If va
is not so large, the optimal σ1 is found by differentiating W1 with respect to σ1:
∂W1
∂σ1
= 2
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ(z)φ(z)φ
(
K
σˆ2
σ1
z + δva
(
σ1 − σˆ
2
1
σ1
))[
σˆ2
σ21
Kz − δva
(
1 +
σˆ21
σ21
)]
dz = 0.
In equilibrium, the owner’s expectations are fulfilled, so this simplifies to∫ ∞
−∞
Φ(z)φ(z)φ(
√
Kz)
(√
K
σˆ1
z − 2δva
)
dz = 0.
Applying (18) and (19), this further simplifies to
√
K
2pi(1 +K)
√
2 +Kσˆ1
− δva√
2pi(1 +K)
= 0 =⇒ δva
√
2pi(1 +K)(2 +K)σˆ1 =
√
K. (33)
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This gives the expression for σ1 in Part 2 of Proposition 7. To get (16), the equation defining K in
Part 2 of the proposition, substitute σ2 = σˆ1/
√
K in (32), then use (33) to substitute for σˆ1 in (32),
and then rearrange. We must have K ≥ 0 for the left hand side of (16) to be real. One can verify
(see the proof of Proposition 8) that the left hand side is increasing in K, is negative at K = 0 and
is positive for large K, so it has a unique solution. This proves Proposition 7.
Proof of Proposition 8: We begin with a lemma that shows that the nonrationed managers add
some risk, so σ2 > σθ+u. Therefore, proving the lemma establishes the proposition for the case
where σ1 = σθ+u. For the case where σ1 > σθ+u, we then prove that σ2 is even larger than σ1.
Lemma 1 Assume that (14) holds and that only division 1 is rationed. Then the nonrationed
managers add risk in equilibrium: σ2 > σθ+u.
Proof of lemma: To reach a contradiction, suppose the equilibrium has σˆ2 = σθ+u, which implies
K ≡ σˆ21/σˆ22 ≥ 1. For this corner solution to be optimal for the nonrationed managers, it would have
to be true that ∂W2/∂σ2 ≤ 0 when evaluated at σ2 = σθ+u. Using the left hand side of (32) and
substituting
√
Kσ2 for σˆ1,
∂W2
∂σ2
∣∣∣∣
σ2=σθ+u
≤ 0 ⇐⇒ δvbσθ+u ≥
√
K(K + 3)
2
√
pi(2 +K)(1 +K)(
√
2K +
√
1 +K)
.
For K ≥ 1, this expression is decreasing in K to a limit of 1/[2(1 + √2)√pi]. This being so, the
inequality implies that δvbσθ+u is greater than 1/[2(1+
√
2)
√
pi], which contradicts (14). Therefore,
one cannot have σ2 = σθ+u in equilibrium, and the lemma is proved.
It remains to prove that when σ1 is larger than σθ+u, σ2 is larger still. For this case, (32) and (33)
jointly determine the equilibrium strategies. Combining these two equations yields the equilibrium
condition (16), which we write as T (K) = 0, with
T (K) ≡
√
K(3 +K)−
(
2
√
K +
√
2(1 +K)
) vb
va
.
T is an increasing function, as T ′(K) has the same sign as(
3
2
√
K
+
3
√
K
2
)(
2
√
K +
√
2 + 2K
)
− (3
√
K +K
√
K)
(
1√
K
+
1√
2 + 2K
)
= 2K +
3
√
2 + 2K
2
√
K
+
2K
√
K√
2 + 2K
> 0.
Since T (0) = −√2vb/va < 0 and T (1) = 4(1 − (vb/va)) > 0, this establishes that there is a unique
K satisfying T (K) = 0 and this solution has K ∈ (0, 1). This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 9: By Proposition 8, the nonrationed managers add strictly more risk than
the rationed manager, i.e., σ1 < σ2 = σ3 in equilibrium. Based on the owner’s Bayesian updating,
the posterior mean θ¯1i has a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation σ2θ/σi. This
implies that the probability that manager 1 is promoted is
2
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ(z)φ(z)
{
1− Φ
(
σ1
σ2
z
)}
dz = 2
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ(z)φ(z)[1− Φ(
√
Kz)] dz.
By integrating separately over {z < 0} and {z > 0} and using the transformation y = −z for
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negative z, this promotion probability can be written
2
∫ ∞
0
Φ(z)φ(z)[1− Φ(
√
Kz)] dz + 2
∫ ∞
0
Φ(
√
Kz)φ(z)[1− Φ(z)] dz
= 2
∫ ∞
0
Φ(z)φ(z)[1− Φ(z)] dz + 2
∫ ∞
0
Φ(z)φ(z)[Φ(z)− Φ(
√
Kz)] dz
−2
∫ ∞
0
[Φ(z)− Φ(
√
Kz)]φ(z)[1− Φ(z)] dz + 2
∫ ∞
0
Φ(z)φ(z)[1− Φ(z)] dz
= 4
∫ ∞
0
Φ(z)φ(z)[1− Φ(z)] dz + 2
∫ ∞
0
[Φ(z)− Φ(
√
Kz)]φ(z){Φ(z)− [1− Φ(z)]} dz
=
1
3
+ 2
∫ ∞
0
[Φ(z)− Φ(
√
Kz)]φ(z){Φ(z)− [1− Φ(z)]} dz.
Each factor in the remaining integral is positive, as z > 0 and
√
K < 1. This proves that the rationed
manager’s promotion probability is greater than 1/3, and the probabilities for the nonrationed
managers are less than 1/3.
46
References
Antle, R., and G. D. Eppen, 1985, “Capital Rationing and Organizational Slack in Capital
Budgeting,” Management Science, 31, 163–174.
Aron, D. J. and E. P. Lazear, 1987, “Competition, Relativism, and Market Choice,” North-
western University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management
Science, Discussion Paper #750.
Bolton, P., J. Scheinkman, and W. Xiong, 2006, “Executive Compensation and Short-
termist Behavior in Speculative Markets,” Review of Economic Studies, 73, 577-610.
Bognanno, M., 2001, “Corporate Tournaments,” Journal of Labor Economics, 19, 290-315.
Cadenillas, A., J. Cvitanic, and F. Zapatero, 2005, “Optimal Risk-Sharing with Effort and
Project Choice,” Working Paper, University of Alberta.
Craig, S., and R. Smith, 2004, “Morgan Stanley Ousts President Amid Shake-Up,” Wall
Street Journal, March 29, C1.
Flint, J., 2004, “Viacom Seals Deal for One, Maybe Two, CEOs After Redstone,” Wall
Street Journal, July 23, A9.
Gitman, L., and J. Forrester, 1977, “A Survey of Capital Budgeting Techniques Used by
U.S. Firms,” Financial Management, 6, 66-71.
Green, J. R., and N. L. Stokey, 1983, “A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts,”
Journal of Political Economy, 91, 349–364.
Grossman, S. J., and O. D. Hart, 1986, “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory
of Vertical and Lateral Integration,” Journal of Political Economy, 94, 691–719.
Harris, M., and A. Raviv, 1996, “The Capital Budgeting Process, Incentives and Informa-
tion,” Journal of Finance, 51, 1139–1174.
Hart, O., and J. Moore, 1990, “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,” Journal of
Political Economy, 98, 1119–1158.
Hirshleifer, D., 1993, “Managerial Reputation and Corporate Investment Decisions,” Fi-
nancial Management, 22, 145-160.
Hirshleifer, D., and Y. Suh, 1992, “Risk, Managerial Effort and Project Choice,” Journal
of Financial Intermediation, 3, 308–345.
Holmstro¨m, B., and J. Ricart i Costa, 1986, “Managerial Incentives and Capital Manage-
ment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 835–860.
Jensen, M. C., 1986, “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers,”
American Economic Review, 76, 323–329.
Lambert, R., D. Larcker, and K. Weigelt, 1993, “The structure of organizational incen-
tives,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 38, 438-461.
Lazear, E. P., and S. Rosen, 1981, “Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Con-
tracts,” Journal of Political Economy, 89, 841–864.
47
MacLeod, W. B., and J. M. Malcolmson, 1988, “Reputation and Hierarchy in Dynamic
Models of Employment,” Journal of Political Economy, 96, 832–854.
Milbourn, T. T., R. L. Shockley, and A. V. Thakor, 1999, “Prestige, Intrafirm Tournaments
and Failure Aversion in Corporate Decisions,” Washington University, St. Louis, Olin
School of Business Working Paper No. 99-003.
Mukherjee, T. K., and V. L. Hingorani, 1999, “Capital-Rationing Decisions of Fortune 500
Firms: A Survey,” Financial Practice & Education, 9, 7-15.
Myers, S. C., and N. S. Majluf, 1984, “Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions
When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have,” Journal of Financial
Economics, 13, 187–221.
Rajan, R. G., H. Servaes, and L. Zingales, 2000, “The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification
Discount and Inefficient Investment,” Journal of Finance, 55, 35–80.
Rosen, S., 1986. “Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments.” American Economic
Review, 76, 701-716.
Scharfstein, D. S., and J. C. Stein, 2000, “The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets:
Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment,” Journal of Finance, 55, 2537–
2564.
Stein, J. C., 1997, “Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Re-
sources,” Journal of Finance, 52, 111–134.
Stein, J. C., 2002, “Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized versus
Hierarchical Firms,” Journal of Finance, 57, 1891–1922.
Thakor, A. V., 1990, “Investment ‘Myopia’ and the Internal Organization of Capital Allo-
cation Decisions,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6, 129-154.
48
Notes
1In a 1976 survey of large US companies, Gitman and Forrester (1977) find that 52% of respondents
engaged in capital rationing. Mukherjee and Hingorani (1999) find 64% of the respondents to a 1992 survey
of the Fortune 500 firms operate in a capital rationing environment at least some of the time.
2See, e.g., Holmstro¨m and Ricart i Costa (1986), Harris and Raviv (1996), Thakor (1990), Stein (1997,
2002), Scharfstein and Stein (2000) and Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000).
3For instance, see Lazear and Rosen (1981), Green and Stokey (1983), Rosen (1986), MacLeod and
Malcolmsen (1988) and Bognanno (2001). Promotion can be an effective method to motivate workers. Lazear
and Rosen (1981) show that the tournament compensation structure for risk-neutral workers produces the
same incentive structure as does the optimal piece contract which pays workers the value of their products.
If it is less costly to observe rank than an individual’s level of output, then tournaments dominate piece
rates.
4The incentive among a set of ex ante symmetric managers to add variance occurs only when there are
at least three managers (see Proposition 1). A manager facing multiple rivals must exceed an extreme value
statistic, the maximum performance of the other competitors. This creates an advantage to having more
extreme outcomes. In contrast, if there is only one rival, then higher variance neither helps nor hurts per se;
if increasing the variance entails a reduction in mean, then this hurts the manager. However, even with only
two players, adding variance can be attractive in a contest in which players are asymmetrically positioned
(Aron and Lazear 1987).
5Such activities could include spending time and firm resources on pure gambles such as trading in
derivative securities unrelated to the firm’s business. But our setting also allows simply for project choices
that are riskier but provide lower expected payoffs.
6The Morgan Stanley episode illustrates a danger of such a maneuver that is outside our model — talented
managers who have been eliminated from the tournament may leave the firm.
7In Antle and Eppen (1985), the manager has private information about production costs and can consume
any excess capital, and the optimal rule involves rationing capital. In Harris and Raviv (1996), the manager
reports his private information, and headquarters can audit the report to see if it is truthful. The managers
in their model like more capital due to the private benefits they derive. They find that certain divisions
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should be rationed, while other divisions should be overfunded. Stein (1997, 2002) and Scharfstein and Stein
(2000) develop models in which the incentives of both the divisions and headquarters are due to private
benefits from controlling capital, and capital rationing arises within the firm only when external capital is
also rationed. Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) offer a model of capital allocation in which the divisions
bargain ex post over the surplus generated by their projects.
8 All of our results continue to hold when project choice is unobservable. The owner desires that the
manager invest in both projects when given two units of capital and in project a when given only one unit of
capital. If this is the behavior anticipated by the owner, one can show that a manager making unobservable
investments would choose to follow that policy.
9In reality, part of the benefit of being promoted to CEO consists of nonpecuniary benefits such as
satisfaction from a more challenging job, prestige, or more pleasant working conditions; and of monetary
benefits that do not come from the firm, such as opportunities to serve on the boards of other firms or gifts
from suppliers. Including nonpecuniary benefits in Z would have no qualitative effect on our results.
10We could also permit managers to distort production so as to reduce variance. In our model with
identical managers, they would never pursue such opportunities. If the managers were not identical ex ante,
one could not rule out risk-reducing distortions. Risk reduction can certainly occur in other settings, such as
models with risk averse managers where losers of the promotion contest (potentially) earn some future rents
(Holmstro¨m and Ricart i Costa 1986), or where owners seek to make profitability a more accurate indicator
of managerial effort (e.g., Hirshleifer and Suh 1992).
11To motivate this formulation, consider an investment project that has value v(1− d) if there is no labor
input. Each of the division’s ten workers has marginal product dv/10 if used productively, so the maximum
project value is v. Alternatively, the manager can send any or all workers to the racetrack to bet $k on an
even-odds horse. The odds are actuarially fair. If the manager chooses to send n workers to the track, this
increases the variance of divisional profits by s2 = nk2. Defining δ = d/(10k2), the value of the project is
v(1− nd/10) = v(1− s2δ), as assumed in the text.
12 For each manager, the posterior mean θ¯1i is an unbiased estimate of the manager’s talent, so maxi θ¯1i
is an unbiased estimate of the talent of the new CEO, θi∗ . For any equilibrium in which the managers follow
identical strategies, each θ¯1i has the same distribution, so the probability that the maximum is less than θ
is F 3(θ), where F is the cumulative distribution function of θ¯1i. Since each θ¯1i is a mean-zero normal, the
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density of maxi θ¯1i is
3f(θ¯)F 2(θ¯) = 3φ(γ)Φ2(γ)/σ(θ¯1i),
where γ = θ¯1i/σ(θ¯1i) is standard normal, φ is the standard normal density and Φ is the standard normal
distribution function. Therefore, the average talent of the new CEO is
E[θi∗ ] =
Z ∞
−∞
3θf(θ)F 2(θ) dθ = 3σ(θ¯1i)
Z ∞
−∞
γφ(γ)Φ2(γ) dγ = 3σ(θ¯1i)/(2
√
pi), (34)
where σ(θ¯1i) = σ
2
θ/
q
σ2θ+u + sˆ
2
i by (3). Substituting into (34) using sˆi = 0 gives (5).
13We use the term first best to denote the best possible outcome for the owner of the firm. Since w is a
transfer, a wage contract that induces the managers to set s = 0 would also achieve social efficiency, but at
greater cost to the owner.
14One can easily extend this intuition to promotion contests at lower levels in the organization. Suppose
there are N managers at a given level who are competing for the prize of being promoted to the next level,
in a setting like the one we model. If fewer than half the managers will be promoted, then their incentives
are to unobservably add variance, even if it destroys value. If more than half the managers will be promoted
to the next level, then the incentives are reversed. If they can do so unobservably, the managers will destroy
value by setting variance inefficiently low.
15Assuming α = 0 is stronger than necessary. So long as Z/α is large, the owner will forgo wage incentives,
because the wage cost is proportional to Z/α.
16The manager’s concern is not the foregone profits, per se, but that the lower mean outcome leads the
owner to less favorable inferences about his ability.
17 To see that smaller δ implies greater destruction of date-0 value through variance manipulation, differ-
entiate (8) and apply Standing Assumption 1. Smaller vb has the same effect on risk distortions.
18 To see why small σu alone is not enough to make rationing attractive, recall that Standing Assumption
1, δvbσθ+u < 1/(2
√
3pi), means that managers add some excess variance. If δvbσθ is close to 1/(2
√
3pi), these
risk distortions will destroy only a small amount of value, so rationing may not be worthwhile even if σu is
tiny.
19We have assumed that the physical use of capital is contractible. (See Section 1.1.) If this were not
the case, then a manager might seek a way to “self-ration” by investing in project a only. For such scheme
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to work, the self-rationing would have to be observable to the owner and the manager would have to find
a way to guarantee that the second unit of capital would not be subject to variance manipulation, perhaps
by posting it in some sort of collateral account. Self-rationing is not an issue when the owner can direct the
manager to invest in this or that project, as we have assumed.
20 Although it is true that large vb makes wages more attractive than rationing, wage incentives will not
be used if vb is very large. In that case, there is no problem to begin with — the owner can achieve first
best without any control mechanism when δvbσθ+u > 1/(2
√
3pi) [Proposition 2].
21With full capital allocations, managerial choices in the symmetric equilibrium when there are n divisions
satisfy
∂W
∂σ

σ=σˆ
= −(n− 1)
Z ∞
−∞
Φ(γ)n−2φ(γ)2

2δvb − γ
σ

dγ = 0.
22The price at which capital is raised depends on the market perception of the manager’s ability, since
ability affects NPV. But since the manager does not know his own ability, there are no Myers-Majluf (1984)
adverse selection problems, which could be viewed as a kind of implicit perverse rationing of capital.
23In fact, under our assumptions, organizing operations as three separate firms is dominated by a structure
with one single-division firm and one two-division firm. Combining two divisions dominates separating them
because it eliminates the incentives to add variance (Proposition 1) and it generates higher average CEO
talent because the better performing of the two managers can be promoted. Analyzing this structure
generates the same comparative statics as three stand-alone firms, so we focus on the simpler structure.
24That is, we are holding aggregate CEO compensation fixed at Z for our thought experiment. Depending
on the structure of the labor market, the choice of organization structure might also affect this aggregate
CEO compensation.
25Footnote 23 mentioned that the completely focused organization is dominated by a combined structure
that includes a two-division firm. The advantage of the conglomerate over this combined structure is smaller,
since some gains are achieved from giving a more talented manager a greater span of control. If we compare
these two organizational forms, (17) becomes
Mσ2θ

3
√
3δvb − 2
3
√
piσθ+u

−

1
4piδvb
− 3σ2θ+uδvb

,
which gives implications identical to those just mentioned in the text.
52
26 Formally, this greater uncertainty about the value that a manager can create would be captured in the
model by a higher variance of manager talent, σ2θ .
27Suppose we compare a policy of narrowing the field from three managers to two against a “default”
policy of full capital allocations, no wage incentives, and a full field of contenders. One can show that
narrowing the field is better than the default policy when δvbσθ+u is less than 1/(3
√
3pi).
28However, the “success factor” might not be monotone, except for firms at the very pinnacle of the
business world. A very successful incumbent CEO is unlikely to be fired, but he or she is more likely to be
lured away to greener pastures.
29Using data on four organizational levels (from the level of plant manager up to CEO) for 303 publicly
traded U.S. firms, Lambert, Larcker, and Weigelt (1993) find that, consistent with tournament theory,
compensation is convex in the manager’s rank in the hierarchy.
30In the absence of mandatory rotation, divisional managers may not offer challenging projects to their
best employees because visible success in such projects could cause the employee to catch the notice of
superiors and earn promotion beyond the domain of the divisional manager.
31This limit can be established using the fact that Φ(−A) < 1/A for all A > 0.
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